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1  My Life and Human Rights
1.1  War and Colonial Occupation
 In 1928 my grandparents moved to Kyoto from the mid Korean Peninsula. 
After the annexation in 1910, Japan looted various resources from the Korean 
Peninsula, and especially in the rural areas, the Japanese Colonial 
Government of Korea and Japanese landowners took Koreans’ land through 
the land survey. Having been driven off their land, Koreans left through the 
North for Manchuria and through the South for Japan.
 On April 3, 1945, right after the U.S. forces landed on Okinawa Island, 
I was born in Keihokuchō, which was called Shūzan at that time. The town 
was located in an obscure area between the mountains. Roads were rough and 
unpaved, with buses sometimes plunged off steep mountain roads. Now it is 
only a half hour’s drive from Kyoto, and we can go there without any diffi-
culty.
 In Japan my grandparents lived first in Tokiwa, Kyoto city. Shortly after 
my parents’ marriage, the Second World War started, and Koreans too were 
drafted for a camp follower. My father was the eldest of six siblings. In those 
days he was the only wage earner of his family of nine, including my grand-
parents and my elder brother. If my father had been drafted, my family would 
have starved to death. So my mother asked the Uzumasa ward mayor to seek 
an exemption for him, and he was allowed to farm and pay a stipend of rice 
in lieu of serving as an army civilian employee.
 Although we had one chō (2.45 acres) of farmland, a size double that of 
the average farmer, we had to submit all the harvested rice to the govern-
ment, while all the barley produced as a subsidiary crop at winter season was 
taken by the landowner as rent. So our family income consisted of only rice 
bran, a byproduct after milling, and soybeans, planted on the dikes of the rice 
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paddies. My family of nine had to collect grass roots and bark to survive.
 After the escalation of the war, my father’s exemption from service was 
canceled, and he ran away. When I was born, my mother was starving and 
could not breastfeed at all. My mother fed me with rice water made from 
broken rice grains and roasted soybeans that she chewed up before feeding 
me. Yet these foods were not easily digested by a newborn baby, so I 
suffered severe diarrhea, became emaciated like a tree branch, and almost 
died.
 On August 15, 1945, my father secretly came home and helped with the 
weeding of the rice paddy. Hearing the news of Japan’s defeat in war, my 
parents kneeled down on the muddy ground and cried. It was the end of our 
family starvation crisis. Later my parents said that it was as if a great wall in 
front of them had suddenly collapsed. If the war had lasted one more month, 
I would have starved to death.
 Two years before the war ended, when my grandmother was pregnant, 
she complained of abdominal pain one day and was suffering late at night. A 
midwife in our rural region said, “The baby is breech. She needs an operation 
at the University Hospital in Kyoto.” My grandmother was then carried on the 
only truck available in Shūzan leaving for Kyoto. However, when the char-
coal-fueled vehicle reached the Kasa mountain ridge near Shūzan, it stopped 
as a result of engine failure, and my grandmother died on the cargo bed 
before dawn. When my mother lived in Tango Yamada village, her sixteen-
year-old cousin, who had been drafted as a railway-switch operator at Tango 
Yamada station, was run over by a train and died. At the time, many Korean 
people died in battlefields, mines, and factories. Under colonial rule, they 
were forced to endure terrible hardships.
1.2  As a Korean Resident in Japan
 At the time of Japan’s defeat in war in 1945, there were approximately 
2.4 million Korean residents in Japan. According to conservative official esti-
mates, about 800,000 of them had been carted off to forced labor. It is said 
that in reality, however, 60 percent of them, 1.4 to 1.6 million Koreans, were 
actually forcefully transferred. After the war, most of them went back to 
Korea, and my grandfather, an uncle, and two aunts also left Japan and 
returned to their hometown in Korea.
 My family moved from Shūzan to Hanazono Konpoku-chō beside 
Myoshinji Temple in Kyoto, where I went to Ōmuro Primary School. Later 
we moved to Nakagyō, where I completed my primary and secondary educa-
tion. Looking back at those days, I started to see myself as Korean when I 
went to kindergarten. I felt that I was somewhat different from my neighbors. 
When my father’s friends came over to our house, they spoke Korean, and 
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when I got into fights with neighborhood children, they shouted “Chōsen 
[Korean]!” at me. In this way, my surroundings in Japan gradually made me 
realize that I was a Korean.
 There were four or five Korean children in every class in my primary 
school, and most of their families were so poor that they could not afford 
textbooks. Sometimes teachers scolded them for not doing their homework. At 
that time I thought it was shameful to be a Korean.
 When I entered middle school, what bothered me most was the question 
of my identity. I had come to notice the differences between myself and 
others in daily-life culture, including such things as language and food. Most 
of the time, the Japanese around me made me aware of my not being 
Japanese. Back in those days most Japanese thought themselves superior to 
Koreans and discriminated against us, owing to the influence of a history of 
colonial rule.
 In April 1960, when I was a third-grader in middle school, the April 19 
Student Uprising took place. This was a rebellion against the dictatorship of 
then South Korean President Syngman Rhee. Even though more than 200 
students and youngsters, including primary- and middle-school students, were 
killed in these demonstrations in Seoul, students continued their rebellious 
campaign without giving in to the shooting by the police. These demonstra-
tions ultimately led to the resignation and exile of President Rhee. Watching 
the news on television, I was left wondering why South Korean middle-
school students, almost the same age as me, participated in demonstrations 
without being afraid of violent suppression.
 In Japan around the same time, the biggest demonstrations in its history 
occurred, opposing the Japan-U.S. Security Treaty. The 1960s is called the 
“Golden Sixties” because so many Asian and African nations gained indepen-
dence. Moreover, opposition to the Vietnam War grew and later evolved into 
the international peace movement. During this time I was engaged in my 
middle-school, high-school, and college studies.1
1.3  The Student Movement
In 1964, when I visited South Korea for the first time, the Japan–South Korea 
Talks were being held. The Treaty on Basic Relations between Japan and the 
Republic of Korea was signed the next year, in 1965. Up until then, although 
Japan had been defeated in the war and had renounced its colonial occupation 
of Korea, it had neither officially acknowledged South Korea nor restored 
 1 Dare ni mo kokyō wa aru no da: Zai Nichi Chōsenjin to watashi だれにも故郷
はあるものだ ―― 在日朝鮮人とわたし (Everyone Has a Hometown: Korean 
Residents in Japan and Me) (Tokyo: Shakaihyōronsha, 2008).
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normal diplomatic relations with the country. So through the treaty, Japan 
sought to terminate colonial rule and establish diplomatic relations with South 
Korea. The negotiations also included discussion of fishery rights and the 
legal status of Korean residents in Japan.
 Yet the most important result of this treaty was to establish economic and 
military relations between Japan and South Korea. Despite the Japan-U.S. 
Security Treaty and the Mutual Defense Treaty between the United States and 
the Republic of Korea, it was difficult for Japan to directly establish military 
relations with South Korea, as Japan had only its Self-Defense Forces, which 
were restricted by article 9 of its constitution. But lack of relations between 
Japan and South Korea was inconvenient for the United States. Around this 
time the Vietnam War had gradually escalated, and the South Korean govern-
ment, responding to a U.S. government request, sent 50,000 to 60,000 troops 
of the ROK Armed Forces to Vietnam, including troops from its Blue Dragon 
and Fierce Tiger divisions. Furthermore, in Okinawa, under military occupa-
tion by the United States at the time, Japan played a role as a logistical base 
for U.S. forces. B-52 bombers left from Okinawa and dropped bombs on 
Vietnam. U.S. Navy Ships replenished food and water supplies, and its 
servicemen recuperated in Japan. Under these circumstances, the U.S. 
government needed military collaboration between Japan and South Korea, 
and so eventually, with strong pressure from the United States, the Treaty on 
Basic Relations between the two nations was signed.
 Through this treaty, Japan, by legally terminating its colonial rule over 
Korea, gained access to the Korean market, and South Korea could receive 
money of celebration for establishment of diplomatic relations, to be used for 
its military government and economic development. While some Japanese 
protested against the treaty, the opposition movement in South Korea was 
much stronger. Without an official apology from Japan for its colonial occu-
pation, the treaty sought to conclude its colonial rule with the wishy-washy 
language of Article 2 of the treaty. It reads “It is confirmed that all treaties 
and agreements concluded between the Empire of Japan and the Empire of 
Korea on or before August 22, 1910, are null and void.” Japan argued that 
this language supported the view that the annexation of Korea had been 
implemented legally, and that the annexation became invalid in 1965 when 
South Korea was recognized as an independent state. South Korea, in 
contrast, claimed that the annexation was forced on Korea by Japanese mili-
tary pressure, and that it had been invalid from the beginning. As for repara-
tions, while having different perspectives, both sides finally reached a 
compromise through a muddled phrase about financial aid to Korea cele-
brating diplomatic normalization and totaling $500 million. This was broken 
down into a $300 million grant and a $200 million assistance loan, without 
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mentioning claim rights at all. This ambiguous settlement led to the current 
problem of a different understanding regarding historical issues between the 
two sides.
 In Japan at the time there was opposition against the Treaty on Basic 
Relations between Japan and the Republic of Korea. Some people criticized it 
as a new U.S.–Northeast Asian military alliance. Japan’s labor unions were 
opposed to it because they thought that with diplomatic normalization, there 
would be an influx of cheap Korean labor, which would cause wages to drop. 
Other Japanese were opposed because they thought it would entrench the 
North-South Korean divide. Yet all of these arguments lacked a view on how 
to resolve questions of responsibility relating to colonial occupation.
 In March 1965, when I first visited South Korea, demonstrations against 
the treaty started at the beginning of the new semester, and the government 
cracked down by invoking the garrison decree on June 3. The garrison decree 
is martial law limited to a specified region, and it allows the government 
temporarily to suspend constitutional rights and gives the military judicial, 
administrative, and police powers. People violating the order were charged in 
military tribunals, and armed forces were stationed at high-profile strategic 
posts in Seoul City.
 When I arrived near the campus of Seoul National University, students 
were throwing stones at riot police, and the police were fighting back with 
tear-gas grenades. I too was affected by the tear gas. Next I went to Korea 
University, in Seoul, and discovered that nearly 3,000 students in a scrum had 
crashed with riot police out the school gate. I saw one student hit in the face 
by a tear-gas grenade. He was bleeding, and other students in the frontline 
carried him inside the university. Several days later, armed forces led by tanks 
broke through the gate of Korea University and arrested students. This inci-
dent is known as the August 29 Army Intrusion on Campus.
 With the police and armed forces occupying their schools, South Korean 
students seemed to be shouldering a heavy historical burden. In those days 
South Korea was truly a poor nation, and I realized that I had a rather 
comfortable and easy life in Japan. I began to think of studying in South 
Korea to help eliminate the suffering of these students by any means 
possible.
 When I was a high-school student, I engaged in activities to support the 
ethnic identity of Korean residents in Japan by setting up the Korean High 
School Student Association of Kyoto. And soon after entering university, I 
joined a movement led by the Korean Student League opposed to the Japan-
Korea Talks. I began fully engaging in the student movement. In the summer 
of my first year in college, I staged a demonstration against the “humiliating 
diplomacy” of Lee Dong-won, then South Korean secretary of foreign affairs. 
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I was seized by police for not having my alien registration card. At 
Tsukinowa police station, I was humiliated by a detective in charge of foreign 
affairs who had once worked in Pyongyang as a detective. He said, “Do you 
know what mong tong gooli [idiot] means?... Hmm. As a Korean, you don’t 
even understand the Korean language.” Former Japanese Imperial detectives 
remained in the Public Safety Division or Foreign Affairs Police and clamped 
down on Korean residents and South Korean refugees in Japan. Through this 
experience I witnessed a bit of the bloody history of suppression.
1.4  Studying in South Korea
 In 1968 I entered Seoul National University. First and foremost, I wanted 
to learn the Korean language. As I mentioned earlier, I developed my identity 
as a Korean because of the Japanese around me. I knew nothing about 
Korean language, history, or culture apart from some Korean foods, such as 
kimchi (Korean pickled cabbage) and Korean barbecue. So I realized that I 
had nothing in me by which I could proactively assert who I was. And I also 
wanted to shoulder even a small portion of the Korean students’ struggles by 
sharing their deep sufferings and pains.
 In the Korean War, approximately 2 to 3 million people were killed, and 
more than 10 million people were separated from their families by the border. 
After the war, the North-South divide escalated, and both sides became more 
hostile. In South Korea, an extreme anticommunist dictatorship emerged, and 
many innocent people were slaughtered and jailed without legal due process. 
It is estimated that more than 1 million civilians were killed around the time 
of the Korean War. Later the militarist government ruled South Korean 
society with a huge military budget for the armed forces. I just wanted to do 
something to alleviate our extraordinary national tragedy, brought about by the 
division generated by the Cold War. Yet I was just a young and naive college 
graduate and did not know much about how to realize this wish.
 Just when I was about to become an assistant teacher, having completed 
my master’s degree in sociology at Seoul National University Graduate 
School, Military Security Command suddenly arrested me on April 18, 1971, 
on suspicion of violating the National Security Act and other charges. Half a 
year later, on October 22, I received a death sentence at my first trial, and on 
December 7, 1972, I received life imprisonment at the second trial. My 
verdict was finalized after an appeal had been turned down. In 1988 my life 
imprisonment was commuted to a 20-year sentence, and on February 28, 
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1990, after having spent 19 years in prison, I was finally released.2
1.5  Imprisonment and Beyond
 During this time, I was subjected to extreme torture and ideological 
conversion. I also witnessed executions. Through this lengthy term in the poor 
conditions of a jail cell, I realized the horror of state violence. Yet supported 
by global campaigns demanding the release of political prisoners, I also 
learned the importance of human-rights activism, which can counter such 
state violence.
 Soon after my release, I went back to Japan, because the South Korean 
government felt uncomfortable with my receiving so much attention from all 
over the world and wanted me to leave South Korea. Because of my partic-
ular experience of spending such a long time in prison, I received many 
lecture requests from various organizations throughout Japan. Although the 
campaigns demanding my release were centered in Japan, other global 
human-rights organizations, including Amnesty International, were also 
engaged in these efforts. I received invitations not only from Amnesty 
International, but also from other American organizations involved in my 
release, so I went to the United States. In the fall of 1990, the year of my 
release, I went on a one-month trip, visiting Los Angeles, San Francisco, 
Chicago, Boston, New York, and Washington, D.C. During this time I got an 
offer to become a visiting research fellow at the University of California, 
Berkeley, and in 1991 I went to San Francisco, where I witnessed mass 
demonstrations against the First Gulf War. At that time I lived in Berkeley 
and received many invitations to speak from American and European organi-
zations. I toured around Europe for one and a half months, and later went to 
South America and Canada. Through these travels I obtained real experiences 
relating to international human-rights activities and had an opportunity to be 
involved in establishing a human-rights nonprofit organization, Stop Torture 
in Korea, at Berkeley.
1.6  International Symposium “The Cold War and State Terrorism in 
East Asia”
 In 1994 I came back to Japan and visited Taiwan. After a lecture in Taipei, 
I visited a former prison for political prisoners, the remains of a political 
concentration camp, Machangzheng (an execution site), and Liuzhangli city 
cemetery (where political criminals were interred). There I witnessed East 
 2 For my experiences of arrest by Military Security Command and my subsequent 
19-year imprisonment, see my Unbroken Spirits: Nineteen Years in South 
Korea’s Gulag (Rowman and Littlefield, 2001).
28 Journal of Cultural Interaction in East Asia   Vol. 4  2013
Asian state violence in the raw. My travels to places that experienced state 
violence started in Taiwan, and I continued my journey to Okinawa, Jeju, and 
Yanbian. Since this trip, I have striven to link the contemporary situation with 
the history of political oppression in Taiwan and South Korea, and I have 
tried to expose the oppression in this region in order to eliminate it. In so 
doing, I have explored what East Asia is and who the East Asian people are. 
East Asians have been ruled by colonization, the Cold War, and a system of 
division. And to ensure a lasting peace in this region, I have struggled to 
draw a road map for converting the U.S.-Japan-oriented regional ruling order, 
which has been interspersed with wars, invasions, and state terrorism, to a 
people-oriented regional order.3
 Since I left prison, I have been interested in peace, human rights, and 
state violence in East Asia, since Japan’s invasion, its colonial rule, its defeat 
in the Pacific War, and Cold War history are deeply related to the division of 
the Korean Peninsula, which decided my fate. And I have pursued these 
topics because unification of the Korean Peninsula cannot be separated from 
a historical turnaround in East Asia. For Koreans, colonial occupation and the 
nation’s division are historical events that occurred in East Asia from the late 
nineteenth century to today, and modern Korean history is a part of modern 
East Asian history.
 In the East Asian region, Japan’s defeat should have resulted in the 
liberation of the Korean and Taiwanese people, but this result was suppressed 
by the start of the Cold War, and Taiwanese and Koreans were left at the 
mercy of state terrorism, such as Taiwan’s White Terror during the 1950s, the 
Jeju April 3 Incident, and massacres in Yeosu and Suncheon, South Korea. To 
dismantle the Cold War structure, to settle past issues, and to liberate the East 
Asian people, victims, researchers, and activists from Japan, South Korea, 
Taiwan, and Okinawa held a series of international symposia titled “The Cold 
War and State Terrorism in East Asia.” Each symposium consisted of three 
sections: witness, fieldwork, and research/analysis. Six international symposia 
have been held in the following places: Taipei (1997) for the fiftieth anniver-
sary of February 28 Incident, Jeju (1998) for the fiftieth anniversary of the 
Jeju April 3 Incident, Okinawa (1998), Kwangju (2000) for the twentieth 
anniversary of Kwangju Massacre, Kyoto (2002), and Yeosu, South Korea 
(2002). One of the achievements of these symposia was the enactment in 
South Korea and Taiwan of the Truth and Compensation Act for State 
Violence. In the movement for this act, I was involved in its proposal, estab-
 3 See So Sun no Higashi Ajia heiwa kikō 徐勝の東アジア平和紀行 (Suh Sung’s 
Peace Pilgrimage in East Asia) (Kyoto: Kamogawa Shuppan, 2011).
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lishment, and implementation.4
 In around 2005 I started, together with other East Asian supporters, to 
protest against the enshrinement of Korean and Taiwanese soldiers’ souls at 
Yasukuni Shrine, since we think that collaboration and peace among the 
diverse nations of East Asia can be achieved only by overturning Japan-
centric regional hegemony, which has been deeply rooted in this region since 
the Meiji era under the slogans of Asianism and the Greater East Asian 
Co-prosperity Sphere. Overturning Japan-centric regional hegemony in East 
Asia would mean true liberation of the people (i.e., independence from colo-
nialism). I realized that the most important task for us is to protest against 
Yasukuni Shrine in a movement seeking correct understanding and settlement 
of history, rather than in a lawsuit demanding the separation of religion and 
politics. The former Japanese imperial military regime glorified Japan’s war 
and drafted Koreans and Taiwanese, who died as soldiers of the imperial 
army. Even now the souls of these soldiers are forced to be honored as impe-
rial soldiers through their enshrinement with Japanese soldiers at Yasukuni 
Shrine. So we established Lighting Peace Candles for the Darkness of 
Yasukuni to demand an end to the forced enshrinement of Korean and 
Taiwanese soldiers there. Since 2006 we have continued this Yasukuni move-
ment as a movement about the right to live in peace, with the right to self-
determination and freedom of thought.
1.7  A Hundred Years after Japan’s Annexation of Korea, “A Declaration 
of History, Human Rights, and Peace in East Asia”
 Recently, in 2010, the hundredth-year anniversary of Japan’s annexation 
of Korea was covered by many newspapers, magazines, and broadcasts, and 
various organizations issued statements or declarations related to this event. 
Though there were minor differences, the basic ideas claimed by these state-
ments were as follows:
• Japan had invaded Korea from the beginning of the modern era.
• Japan’s annexation of Korea was unjustifiable, and the Japan-Korea 
Annexation Treaty was illegal.
• Owing to the 1965 Treaty on Basic Relations between Japan and the 
Republic of Korea, assessment of the annexation treaty and Japan’s 
colonial rule have become ambiguous.
 4 See Higashi Ajia no reisen to kokka terorizumu: Bei-Nichi chūshin no chiiki 
chitsujo no haizetsu o mezashite 東アジアの冷戦と国家テロリズム――米日中心
の地域秩序の廃絶をめざして (The Cold War and State Terrorism in East Asia: 
Toward Elimination of the U.S.-Japan-Centered Regional Order) (Tokyo: 
Ochanomizu Shobō, 2004).
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• Early implementation of the 2002 Japan–North Korea Pyongyang 
Declaration is necessary to settle with North Korea over Japan’s colonial 
occupation.
• In commemorating the one hundred years since Japan’s annexation of 
Korea, the Japanese prime minister should declare the annexation treaty 
illegal and invalid and settle past issues with a sincere apology.
 Traditionally, discussion of the annexation of Korea has focused mainly 
on the illegality of the annexation and subsequent treaty. The Japanese 
government’s view, it has been said, has shifted from considering the annexa-
tion and treaty as legitimate to considering it unjustifiable but legal, whereas 
the Korean side has continued to claim it as both unjustifiable and, in the 
original context, illegal. The Korean government’s argument has two prongs. 
First of all, Japan’s annexation of Korea was illegitimate, because it was 
forced. International law during the age of imperialism should be denounced 
as the law of aggressor takes all. Second, this treaty did not even comply with 
such defective international law, since its terms were defective, it lacked the 
emperor’s seal, and it was not ratified.
 There is concern, however, that discussion on the hundredth anniversary 
of the annexation could be trivialized by paying attention just to the legality 
or illegality of the treaty. And there is a flaw in reasoning that laws made 
during the age of imperialism are justified if the ratification process was 
legal. The legitimacy of such laws should be questioned because they were 
established to enslave and discriminate against people in order to rule them. 
For example, though Taiwan became Japan’s legal territory through the 
Treaty of Shimonoseki, in reality its people were sold out by their feudal 
rulers’ agreement, and they knew nothing about the deal. For these reasons, 
and since there was no popular sovereignty at the time, the legitimacy of any 
such treaty arbitrarily signed by autocratic rulers should be questioned.
 In addition, discussion on the hundred-year anniversary did not fully 
clarify the history of Japan’s colonial occupation of Korea. Japan’s aggression 
began with the Invasion of Ganghwa Island in 1875, and substantive colonial 
rule was already in place by the Russo-Japanese War of 1905. From Japan’s 
standpoint, the annexation of Korea should not be trivialized as a mere ethnic 
conflict. Instead, it should be positioned as one of a series of aggressions and 
administrative rules on Hokkaido, Okinawa, and Taiwan since the beginning 
of the Meiji era, and it needs to be recognized in the much broader context of 
world history. On the hundredth anniversary, the annexation of Korea should 
be considered from the universal viewpoint of denying colonial rule.
 In 2001 the “World Conference against Racism, Racial Discrimination, 
Xenophobia, and Related Intolerance” was held in Durban, South Africa, and 
concluded with the “Durban Declaration and Action Programs.” This epoch-
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making conference reviewed the previous 400 to 500 years of world history, 
when Western imperialism ruled the world. It defined slavery and colonial 
rule imposed by Western states as crimes against humanity. The Durban 
Declaration defined the modern age as a period when so-called Western civi-
lization ruled over so-called barbarianism, and it went on to point out that the 
Western domination created discrimination and prejudice, which led to barba-
rous acts of slavery and colonial occupation. The declaration can be viewed 
as the most significant event in the twenty-first century to question the origins 
of today’s rule and discrimination, and to raise the issue of international 
human rights. Since the conference was held in Africa, the emphasis, natu-
rally, was on slavery. The issue of colonial rule was not mentioned in detail. 
Rather, it was referred to in only two out of several hundred items on the 
agenda.
 Inspired by the Durban Declaration, I decided to promote an East Asian 
version created by citizens and asserting that a proper settlement of the past 
is necessary to ensure collaboration and a peaceful future in East Asia. 
Starting on this hundredth anniversary of Japan’s annexation of Korea, we 
should acknowledge that East Asia has incurred tremendous damage as a 
result of a century of Western aggression, war, and colonial rule. To rectify 
matters, we need to realize a sincere settlement of the past—including apolo-
gies, compensation, and prevention of reoccurrence. I believe that Japan’s 
responsibility for its past colonial rule should be looked at in a more 
universal and historical context. For these reasons, I decided to establish “A 
Declaration of History, Human Rights, and Peace in East Asia” as an East 
Asian version of the Durban Declaration. I wanted to put this declaration out 
there to raise questions about universal human rights. I am now planning to 
position this declaration as a document sponsored by the United Nations, 
which should always be referred to whenever arguments arise regarding the 
East Asian Community or cooperation in East Asia. First, we collected the 
demands of nongovernmental organizations concerned with peace and human 
rights in this region in order to create an action program. Then planning got 
under way to hold a conference in September 2011 to issue an East Asia 
Declaration, ten years after the Durban Declaration.
2  Exploring Human Rights in East Asia
2.1  Are Human Rights Universal?
 After overturning autocratic rule, citizens obtained power and became 
individuals with inalienable rights in modern nation-states. Basically, the 
concept of human rights was created to assure the individual of protection 
from the violence of state power, and the fiction of a social contract was 
introduced to control state power. For a long time, human rights were consid-
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ered a privilege of being protected as citizens under state sovereignty. Such 
rights, however, were restricted to males of the privileged classes of Western 
nations. Commoners, colonial subjects, and females were excluded from these 
“universal rights of human beings.”
 Yet in the Declaration of the Rights of Man and of the Citizen (1789), it 
was stipulated that “men are born and remain free and equal in rights.” That 
is, human rights, based on transcending natural law, were claimed to inhere 
universally in the individual per se. Because they are universal, they inevi-
tably obtained a liberating feature as people pushed to eliminate restrictions to 
specific groups. Thus, the concept of universal human rights contained within 
it the germ of a mission to expand its horizon by continuously seeking the 
realization of rights among wider and wider groups. That mission was first to 
eliminate discrimination inside the nation-state, then to do away with 
discrimination among nations and organizations, and finally to seek universal 
human rights for all.
 Though human rights have been claimed to be universal, human rights 
have in fact lacked universality since the emergence of modern civil society. 
When people speak of universal human rights, they are speaking of a 
declared program that has yet to be realized. Throughout history up to the 
present, human rights have never been universal. Modern laws, especially 
those created in Western nations, are especially nonuniversal in nature, 
because they have emerged under a violent regime of international law based 
on the worldview that “civilization” is superior to “barbarianism.”
 From the Opium Wars (1839–1842, 1856–1860) on, Western imperial 
powers became more prominent in East Asia. Under the pretext of advancing 
“civilization” over “barbarianism,” they forced unequal treaties on East Asian 
nations through invasions. After going through the long era of aggression and 
colonial rule, many nations in East Asia formally achieved independence after 
the end of the Second World War, yet they failed to establish democracy and 
systems that value human rights. In addition, East Asia was divided by the 
wall of the Cold War, and both Eastern and Western powers paid attention 
only to their own superiority in relation to other nations. States advocated 
democracy and human rights merely as ideological demagogy. While the 
United States criticized socialist and nonallied nations for lacking freedom, 
human rights, and democracy, and even meddled in these nations to bring 
about regime change, it also turned a blind eye toward dictatorships, suppres-
sion of human rights, and genocide committed by states within its own bloc, 
or even encouraged these things.
 In socialist nations, human-rights theory advocated people’s ultimate 
liberation through class revolution. Hence in China, universal human rights 
were denied on the basis of the theory of class dictatorship. In other East 
33Exploring Human Rights in East Asia
Asian nations, such as South Korea and Taiwan, their autocratic regimes, 
under the guise of “anticommunism” and with the support of the United 
States, continuously and repeatedly slaughtered people and committed 
human-rights abuses. In this region, it was only after the 1970s that the 
process of democratization began and human-rights issues started to draw 
attention.
 In East Asia, Japan has been considered an exemplary nation embodying 
democracy and human rights. After the Second World War, its constitution 
was revised to stipulate that sovereignty resided in the people, and the people 
became citizens, rather than subjects. As a result, the Japanese have become 
more aware of human rights. However, the concept of human rights has often 
been understood only superficially, and many people have not achieved the 
deeper understanding that human rights are a means to protect against state 
violence. Under the Meiji Constitution, the Japanese people were subjects in 
a servile position, and even in the postwar Japanese constitution, provision for 
the emperor is contained in chapter 1, even though the people are designated 
as sovereign in article 1 and the “Rights and Duties of the People” are 
included in chapter 3 as fundamental sections of the constitution. This shows 
that postwar Japan has not completely broken with the past, and that the 
Japanese have failed to proactively establish the modern notion of the indi-
vidual by themselves. For this reason, the concept of human rights is not fully 
developed in Japan. After the Second World War, the United States, which 
occupied Japan, revised Japan’s constitution, putting more emphasis on peace 
and democracy as basic features, and dismantled Japan’s militarism, to 
prevent Japan from threatening its security again. It can be argued that the 
essential notion of human rights is not fully shared by the Japanese, because 
the new constitution was established without their own violent struggles to 
seize sovereignty.
 Even though the concept of human rights has continuously improved and 
expanded in substance, the notion of human rights has always been a nonuni-
versal concept built into the Western idea of civilization, according to which 
the West dominates the world order. Especially in the context of modern East 
Asian history, where state violence has been prominent in wars, aggression, 
colonial rule, and massacres, what people valued most were such basic rights 
as the right to life and the right to live in peace and security. Even issues 
from everyday life, such as discrimination against Koreans in Japan, have as 
a background Japan’s invasion and colonial rule, which was based on a 
unidimensional worldview of civilization versus barbarianism. Without real-
izing this squarely, people will find it impossible to acquire universal human 
rights from rulers and oppressors.
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2.2  Civilization and Barbarianism
 Since the Peace of Westphalia (1648), which was based on theories of 
state independence and equality and on noninterference in internal affairs, the 
world system of sovereign states was gradually established, and this new 
order created new international relations while undermining the medieval 
European hierarchical order. It also opened the door to a modern civil society, 
ruled by the people, who are independent and equal. However, independent 
sovereignty, after Westphalia and up to the present, was a privilege given only 
to those nations that met the standards of being “civilized,” and was not 
allowed to those regarded as “barbaric” or “uncivilized.” Universal human 
rights neither existed nor were allowed in such “barbaric” nations.
 At the time, the mission of “civilization” was to cultivate the “barbarians,” 
and Western nations’ invasions, dominance, and conversions of the “barbaric” 
world were even regarded as a mission. So what is civilization? In general, 
civilization is general prosperity based on the latest science, technology, and 
literature. But if it flourishes on the basis of aggression, dominance, and 
exploitation of “barbarianism,” such “civilization” itself should be called 
barbaric.
 In 1989, at the two-hundredth commemorative symposium of the 
Declaration of the Rights of Man and of the Citizen in Paris, one African 
representative reportedly pointed out that over the past 200 years, this decla-
ration has never crossed over the Mediterranean to Africa. Even after Western 
society obtained the concept of human rights through peoples’ revolutions, 
universal human rights were never extended beyond the wall of civilization, 
and even with Western propaganda and cultivation, human rights have never 
been universalized.
 In addition, even after scholars of civilization theory criticized the domi-
nance of Western civilization and took a relativist standpoint when discussing 
various cultures, Samuel P. Huntington, in The Clash of Civilizations and the 
Remaking of World Order (1996), claimed that Western culture is superior. 
Even today, when some scholars consider the notion of civilization to be a 
theory of hegemony pursued by imperialism, violence at the Guantanamo Bay 
detention camp and at Abu Ghraib prison could not be stopped, because this 
violence was justified as necessary to further the three values of freedom, 
democracy, and the market economy. Steeped in these values, the unidimen-
sional worldview of civilization versus barbarianism is still deeply rooted and 
prevents universal human rights from spreading to the “barbarians” by 
labeling them as “terrorists” or “rouge states,” etc. Even today, aggression, 
domination, and human-rights violations have been justified in the name of 
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civilization.5
 While Western nations have enjoyed special privileged positions as domi-
nant players in the world, they have criticized non-Western nations for not 
meeting Western standards of “universal human rights” and have used this 
circumstance as a means to control them. In reaction, the rest of the world 
has criticized the Western theory of universal human rights.
 In 1994 a controversy surrounding Asian notions of human-rights theory 
erupted at the World Conference on Human Rights in Vienna. Asian nations 
asserted that human rights accrue in stages and that they are culturally rela-
tive, and Western nations fiercely criticized this stance by stressing the 
universality of human rights. Admittedly, socialism, Confucian culture, and 
collectivism in Asian nations have a restrictive totalitarian nature, which 
might conflict with freedom for individuals. The Asian view that other 
nations may not interfere in human-rights issues in Asian nations because of 
national sovereignty, based on experiences of being colonized and invaded, is 
by no means a universal human-rights theory. Rather, it is more like propa-
ganda to defend the administrations of Asian states. Yet Western criticism of 
East Asian human rights is also a kind of propaganda, in this case, an advo-
cacy of regime change, rather than a pure effort to realize universal human 
rights.
2.3  What Is East Asia?
 East Asia is not just a geographical classification on the world map. The 
Chinese writer Lu Xun wrote, “For actually the earth had no roads to begin 
with, but when many people pass one way, a road is made” (“故郷” [My Old 
Home]). In the beginning, the word “Asia” referred just to Asia Minor. With 
the expansion of the Western world, the concept of Asia also expanded. 
Starting from the Near East, it eventually encompassed Korea and Japan. 
During the past 500 years of modernity, with the aggression and domination 
of strong Western powers, the regional distinctions of Latin America, Africa, 
and Asia were shaped. Thus, Asia is a concept of a historical and political 
regional order created by the aggression and domination of Western Europe.
 Since the Meiji period, Japan had two different choices in seeking self-
reliance and independence against overwhelming pressure from Western 
Europe, and these two alternatives were not clearly contradictory, but rather 
interdependent and complementary. One path, the path of Asianism, was to 
collaborate with other East Asian nations against Western empires. The other 
 5 See Abe Hiroki 阿部浩己, Kokusai hō no bōryoku o koete 国際法の暴力を超え
て (Beyond the Violence of International Laws) (Tokyo: Iwanami Shoten, 
2010).
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path, that of Westernization, was to oppress other East Asian nations by 
emulating Western imperialism. Eventually Japan chose to join the “civilized” 
nations of the West by establishing its foundation on aggression and domina-
tion of other East Asian nations, while saying good-bye to its bad Asian 
friends. Hoisting the slogan of “cultural enlightenment” and resorting to 
violence, Japan sought Western nations’ recognition as a “civilized nation” by 
thoroughly mimicking them. In the Meiji era, Japan’s main objective in its 
diplomacy was revision of the unequal treaties, and to realize this objective, 
Japan had to show its “true ability.” Building an alliance with Britain, a 
nation antagonistic toward Russia in its global strategy, Japan, by winning 
victories in the Sino-Japanese War and the Russo-Japanese War, obtained 
control over the Korean peninsula. And only after being recognized as a 
“civilized” nation as a result of these victories did Japan’s wish for treaty 
revision became possible. Only one year after its annexation of Korea, Japan 
rose briskly as a small empire in East Asia.
 Ironically, through aggression and domination Japan transformed the 
notion of Asia, first created by the West, into the idea of a Japan-centric 
regional order. Just as Japan produces superior goods by copying and 
improving foreign articles, so Japan created its own version of Asia by modi-
fying the Western concept of Asia. As Professor Kokubun Ryōsei of Keio 
University says, “Asia is Japan.” To convert a Sino-centric East Asian order 
into a Japan-centric East Asian regional order, Japan reconstructed the notion 
of Asia. But Japan used the term “Asianism,” instead of the blatant 
“Japanism,” to avoid raising suspicions. Thereafter, Japan, a small empire, 
promoted regional control to establish the Empire of Japan, while hiding its 
ambition under the name “Asia,” “East Asia,” or “Greater East Asia.” 
However, the true nature of Japan’s “Asianism” became unveiled with the 
Greater East Asia Co-prosperity Sphere and the Greater East Asia Holy War.
2.4  The Cold War and State Terrorism
 After Japan’s war defeat in 1945, efforts to dismantle Japan’s militarism 
and settle the system of colonial rule were interrupted by the start of the Cold 
War. As a result, the East Asian region was realigned under U.S. domination. 
Since Japan supported the U.S. strategy in East Asia and could restore rela-
tionships with (pro-Japanese) former colonial-rule collaborators with the 
strong backing of enormous American force, Japan retained its influence in a 
large part of the former Greater East Asia Co-prosperity Sphere, and as a 
result, East Asians could not fully liberate themselves.
 The Cold War was a system under which the United States and the former 
Soviet Union established rival global blocs not only in terms of politics and 
the military, but also in terms of ideology, economy, society, and culture, and 
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they rivaled with each other across the board. Furthermore, the Cold War 
froze the decolonization process in East Asia. Thus, national liberation in East 
Asia was thwarted, even though it had been the fervent wish of East Asians 
since the Opium Wars. U.S. interests in military strategy crippled the process 
of dismantling Japanese militarism in East Asia. This ensured that Japan 
would remain a major American collaborator, which dampened East Asians’ 
enthusiasm for national liberation. What resulted were raging struggles and 
civilian genocide in South Korea, Taiwan, and Southeast Asian nations.
 In East Asia, the forefront of the Cold War, a wall of division was created 
across the Korean Peninsula, the Taiwan Strait, and Vietnam, and under 
martial law, extreme state violence spread extensively. In South Korea, an 
authoritarian regime continued for almost half a century, from both before to 
well after the Korean War. In China, after the civil war, the Chiang Kai-shek 
regime moved to Taiwan and ruled there under martial law for as long as 37 
years. Vietnam experienced a 40-year-long war.
 In these nations, many perished as a result of state violence. In South 
Korea, it is said that as many as 1 million civilians were killed by state 
violence during the Korean War, the North-South division, and the National 
Security Act regime, from the Jeju April 3 Incident to the Kwangju Massacre. 
In Taiwan, tens of thousands of civilians were slaughtered in the February 28 
Incident and the subsequent White Terror of the 1950s. These victims were 
long dishonored as “insurgents,” “dissidents,” “traitors,” and “Reds.”
 In the 1980s in Taiwan and South Korea, gross human-rights violations 
through state violence were eventually raised as a central issue of protest 
against dictatorships in the course of the democracy movement. And the 
collapse of the Soviet Union and U.S.-Soviet rivalry in 1989 gave momentum 
to this movement. Then the movement advocating restoration of honor and 
compensation for state violence emerged. In South Korea, restoring honor and 
giving compensation to the families of Kwangju Massacre victims made a 
significant breakthrough during the Cold War, and as a result, the Special Act 
on the Restoration of Honor of Persons Involved in the Geochang Incident 
was passed in 1996. Although the Law for the Restoration of Honor and 
Compensation for Civilians Massacred before and after the Korean War 
remains unsettled, the Special Act for the Investigation of the Jeju April 3 
Incident and for the Restoration of the Honor of Victims was enacted in 
December 1999. Concurrently, the Act on the Restoration of the Honor of and 
Compensation for Persons Engaged in the Democratic Movement and the 
Special Act on the Investigation of Suspicious Deaths came into effect in 
2000. In Taiwan, the Law for Compensation for the February 28 Incident was 
enacted in 1995, and the Act for Compensation of Victims of 50 Years of 
White Terror passed the Diet in 1998.
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 The above are examples of progress in East Asia in receiving delayed 
justice and settling the past. However, it is problematic that Japan has not 
proceeded to settle its past, and this has resulted in the following issues:
• Japan’s problematic historical perceptions
• The controversy over history textbooks
• Wartime comfort women
• The forced enshrinement of Korean and Taiwanese soldiers at Yasukuni 
Shrine
• Carting off Koreans to forced labor
• The Korean massacre after the Great Kanto Earthquake
2.5  Conclusion
 In view of the above understanding and historical course of human rights, 
one can see that human rights in East Asia differ from Western “universal 
human rights.” Thus, to expose the false understanding of “universal human 
rights” and to realize true human rights in East Asia, we need to rid ourselves 
of so-called “universal human rights” under Western hegemonic control. And 
in East Asia, we also need to rid ourselves of a Japan-centric understanding 
of Asia and reform the regional order. The most important task is to 
dismantle the order of domination that has continued over the past 500 years 
and to realize true human rights by renouncing the colonial past and ques-
tioning Japan’s and Western nations’ responsibilities for their imperialist 
pasts.
 In the meantime, the most significant challenge ahead of us is to end the 
state of conflict on the Korean Peninsula that has continued since the Korean 
War and establish a system of peace there. Next, we should investigate and 
restore the honor of innocent victims of past state violations of human rights 
by Japan, whether they occurred inside and outside Japan. To achieve these 
goals, we should first establish a clear international consensus on the idea that 
colonial rule is a crime against humanity.
